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Same Effect, Same Cause (APPLIED EPISTEMOLOGY)
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Ishmael


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Same Effect, Same Cause

For many years now, I have thought this AE principle the most controversial. I have written long pieces defending it. Here is one below...

What must prove controversial is this notion of ours that we may presume the same cause at work wherever we observe the same effect in operation. Regardless of objections; this presumption is quite reasonable.

While it is possible for similar effects to arise from different causes, the simplest conceivable proposition is that the same cause is at work everywhere the effect it produces is observed. Allowing for a second factor to produce the same phenomenon may appear to make the phenomenon more likely but it complicates the structure of reality; “If X, or if Z, then Y,” is more complicated than “If X then Y.” Complex structures of reality are inherently less likely to ultimately prove true.

Where the simplest proposition remains possible, it is probable. Therefore, when a particular phenomenon is attributed to a particular factor, all like phenomenon must be attributed to the same factor (or to a factor of the same kind) wherever we cannot show otherwise. Reason obliges us to presume the simplest proposition that has not yet been falsified by data to the contrary.

Thus, knowing what causes an effect in even a single case, empowers us to infer the cause wherever the effect is observed.

Now I discover that the notion was contained in Issac Newton's own formulation of Occam's Razor.
We are to admit no more causes of natural things than such as are both true and sufficient to explain their appearances. Therefore, to the same natural effects we must, as far as possible, assign the same causes.

The only difference is in our application of presumptive logic. We would say that the universe itself generally admits to "no more causes of natural things than such as are both true and sufficient to explain their appearances" and that, for this reason, to the same natural effects we must, as far as possible, presume the same causes.
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